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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
JOSE MARIO JIMENEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20000044-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF 
POINT I. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT SUGGESTS JIMENEZ1 MISTRIAL 
MOTION WAS DENIED BECAUSE HE FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT UNDER BOTH PARTS OF THE 
RELEVANT ANALYSIS. YET. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE 
MOTION ON PREJUDICE GROUNDS. THAT SHOULD BE THE FOCUS 
OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Appellant Jose Mario Jimenez1 has claimed prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. 
To prevail on such a claim, the Utah Supreme Court has specified that a defendant must 
establish the following: 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so objectionable as to merit 
reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in considering in determining their 
verdict, and [2] were they [the jurors], under the circumstances of the particular 
case, probably influenced by those remarks. 
1
 The state points out in its Brief of Appellee that the record on appeal contains two 
separate spellings for Appellant: "Jiminez" and "Jimenez." (State's Brief of Appellee 
(S.B.) at 8 n.l.) The correct spelling is as set forth in the original charging document (R. 
4-7) and judgment (R. 308): Jimenez. 
State v. Valdez. 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973); State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 
1984) (Valdez is the leading case in the area of prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Span, 
819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991) (citing Troy, 688 P.2d at 486 ); see also State v. Basta. 
966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (court considers whether error was substantial 
and prejudicial) (quoting State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied. 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); see also Brief of Appellant at Point I. The state's 
brief suggests Jimenez has failed to establish both parts of the Valdez test. Yet, the first 
prong is met. See infra Point LA., herein. In addition, Jimenez has established prejudice, 
thereby warranting reversal in this case. See infra Point LB., herein. 
A. WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST PART OF VALDEZ. THE TRIAL COURT 
RULED IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENSE AND SUSTAINED OBJECTIONS TO 
EACH IMPROPER COMMENT/QUESTION FROM THE PROSECUTOR. 
The state recognizes on appeal that this Court will review a trial court's ruling on a 
motion for a mistrial under an abuse-of-discretion standard and will reverse the trial 
court's ruling if it is "plainly wrong." (State's Brief of Appellee (S.B.) at 15-16.) In this 
case, the trial court sustained each defense objection relating to prosecutorial misconduct 
on the grounds that the prosecutor's question/comment violated the rules of evidence 
and/or the pretrial motion in limine. (See S.B. at 14-15.) Thereafter, once each objection 
was sustained, the trial court nevertheless denied Jimenez' "mid-trial motion for mistrial" 
(S.B. at 7) on the grounds that Jimenez was not harmed by the misconduct. The trial 
court's rulings on defendant's objections support the determination that Jimenez has 
2 
established the first part of the Valdez test. See Span, 819 P.2d at 335 (step one was met 
where prosecutor's questions violated order limiting examination). 
Specifically, the state acknowledges that during the defendant's case-in-chief the 
prosecutor made insinuations and comments concerning Jimenez's character as follows: 
(a) during Jimenez' cross-examination the prosecutor asked about Jimenez' use of other 
false names (S.B. at 10); (b) during Dr. Rothfeder's cross-examination, the prosecutor 
twice made reference to Jimenez' "other history of violence" (S.B. at 11); (c) the 
prosecutor asserted during Monica's cross-examination that Jimenez' possession of a gun 
was a crime "in and of itself' (S.B. at 11); and (d) the prosecutor asked Monica if she 
assisted in "concealing" Jimenez from police. (S.B. at 12.) 
Also, the trial court sustained each defense objection relating to the above 
comments and questions. "[T]he State's question regarding aliases was improper" under 
the motion in limine and on the basis that it was not supported by admissible evidence 
(S.B. at 14; R. 344:469-70); "defendant's objection to the State's reference to defendant's 
violent behavior [was] sustained" on the basis that the prosecutor's question was 
irrelevant (S.B. at 15); the trial court "sustained the objection" concerning the "illegality 
of the concealed weapon" on the basis that the question was irrelevant (S.B. at 14 (citing 
R. 344:471-72)); and the state's questions as to whether Monica participated in 
"concealing defendant from the police" was sustained. (S.B. at 13.) 
Notwithstanding the trial court's rulings, the state argues that Jimenez has failed to 
3 
"show how any of the questions challenged on appeal necessarily raises an improper 
inference that defendant himself had not raised." (S.B. at 16.) The state seems to argue 
that the prosecutor's questions and statements were admissible and permissible under the 
"open-door" doctrine.2 
Yet, the state has failed to identify any instance in the record when "defendant 
himself (S.B. at 16) opened the door to the prosecutor to ask the improper questions 
and/or to make the improper comments. 
Consider the prosecutor's improper questions/comments regarding Jimenez' "other 
false names." Jimenez admitted on direct examination that he used an alias in 1994 in 
order "to obtain free medical services." (S.B. at 17.) The alias was "Antonio Sanchez." 
(R. 343:366, 368.) Jimenez' admission on direct examination that he was not truthful in 
1994 constituted an honest statement at trial. Nothing was out of context to warrant the 
opening of the door by the prosecutor. 
2
 That argument would require this Court to reverse the trial court's rulings on the 
defendant's objections to the prosecutor's questions and comments. To that end, this 
Court would be required to consider the issue of admissibility as it related to each of the 
four questions/comments. Specifically, did the trial court select the correct rule of 
evidence in ruling on each objection, did the trial court correctly interpret that rule, and 
did the trial court correctly apply the rule? See State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). Also, should the trial court have permitted the 
prosecutor's questions and comments under the open-door doctrine? 
Since the state has not argued that the trial court erred in its rulings on the 
objections to each individual question and comment, and the state has not demonstrated 
that the trial court misapplied the rules of evidence, the state's argument for application of 
the open-door doctrine as an alternative ground for affirmance must fail. 
4 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor proceeded with cross-examination as follows: "So 
Mr. Jim[e]nez, you admit you lied to the people who were providing you the medical 
care." Jimenez admitted he did. (R. 343:369.) The prosecutor then stated, "You used the 
name, what, Carlos Sanchez?" And, "[t]hese or en't the only other false names that 
you've used, are they?" (R. 343:369 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor held up an 
inadmissible FBI rap sheet during the questioning. (See R. 344:463-67 (judge agreed that 
FBI rap sheet was inadmissible).) The question did not require an answer in order for the 
prosecutor to get the desired effect. 
Since the prosecutor's statements did not bring context to the matter, the open-
door doctrine would be inapplicable.3 The trial court properly ruled that the prosecutor's 
statements concerning the "other false names" was inadmissible under the pretrial 
"motion in limine," which related to Utah R. Evid. 402, 403 and 609 (1999). (R. 
344:469-70; 155-56.) The trial court's ruling was correct and appropriate.4 
3
 The trial court ruled that the prosecutor's examination was improper. (R. 344:469-70.) 
Nevertheless, the trial court denied the motion for a mistrial on the basis that Jimenez was 
not "prejudiced" or "harmed" because the jury was already aware that he lied in 1994 and 
that he used an alias to receive free medical care. (R. 344:469-71.) The prejudice 
analysis is separate and distinct from the issue of admissibility. 
Jimenez has discussed prejudice below. See infra. Point LB. 
4
 The state relies on People v. Huvnh. 626 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 
1995), to support that when a defendant has led the jury to believe he used aliases because 
he was confused about his real name, the defendant has opened the door to allow the 
prosecutor to present evidence relating to defendant's other use of the aliases. (S.B. at 
17.) Those circumstances do not exist in this case. An honest statement about the use of 
(continued.. .) 
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Further, the prosecutor plainly held up the inadmissible FBI rap sheet to 
communicate to the jury that he had a list of aliases relating to Jimenez, thereby 
prejudicing the jury. No other purpose could be served by such improper conduct. 
In this case, the reference to "other false names" (R. 343:369) "very likely may 
have led the jury to speculate as to defendant's reason for using" such names. Troy, 688 
P.2d at 486: see also People v. DowdelL 453 N.Y.S.2d 174,177 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 
1982); People v.Evans, 449 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1982). That is 
improper. The first part of the Valdez test is satisfied. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486 (under step 
one, prosecutor improperly called attention to matters outside the evidence). 
With respect to the prosecutor's questions concerning Jimenez' "history of 
violence," and unlawful flight, the trial court considered the questions to be improper and 
irrelevant. (See R. 344:472.) The state asserts the jury could have understood the 
reference to "any other history of violence" to relate to Jimenez as a victim or 
"perpetrator." (S.B. at 18.) Undoubtedly, the prosecutor also recognized the double 
meaning, making it impossible for Jimenez to dispute the improper implication without 
possibly opening a door to the presentation of information that otherwise would be 
an alias does not open the door to the presentation of otherwise inadmissible evidence. 
Also, the state relies on Chase v. State, 541 P.2d 867, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1975), where the court ruled defendant opened the door to allow the prosecutor to 
introduce evidence of other aliases when the defendant implied during direct examination 
that he only used one alias. (S.B. at 17.) That circumstance likewise does not exist in 
Jimenez' case. 
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inadmissible. Since Jimenez was being charged and tried for murder, a crime of violence, 
it was improper for the prosecutor to make such a reference. It "was totally unnecessary 
and served no valid purpose." Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. It "may have led the jury to 
speculate," id., as to Jimenez' character as a "perpetrator" (S.B. at 18) of violence. See 
State v. Howell 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982) (evidence of acts of violence, not resulting 
in a conviction, is not admissible on the issue of a witness' credibility). Jimenez has met 
the first part of the Valdez test with respect to those comments and questions. 
Finally, with regard to the prosecutor's statement to Monica that Jimenez 
committed a crime "in and of itselff when he carried the concealed weapon on the night 
of the offense, that remark called the attention of jurors to improper matters. (See R. 
344:471.) The state disagrees. 
According to the state, it is "pure conjecture" to believe the jury understood the 
statement to refer to a criminal past or uncharged criminal conduct. (S.B. at 16.) Yet, the 
statement could not have been clearer. It left nothing to speculation. Indeed, the way in 
which the question was asked made Monica's answer irrelevant: "yes" she knew it was a 
crime, or "no" she did not know. The prosecutor ensured that the jury was aware Jimenez 
engaged in an alleged additional, uncharged crime "in and of itself' on the night of the 
offense. That was improper. Utah R. Evid. 608(b) (1999); HoweU, 649 P.2d at 97 
(evidence of acts not resulting in conviction is not admissible on the issue of witness' 
credibility); State v. Starks. 581 P.2d 1015, 1016-17 (Utah 1978) (specific acts of 
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misconduct that do not result in criminal convictions are inadmissible); State v. Herrera. 
330 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Utah 1958). Jimenez has established the first part of the Valdez 
test. 
The trial court granted each defense objection relating to the prosecutor's improper 
comments and questions. The remarks called to the attention of jurors matters they would 
not be justified in considering, including the suggestion that Jimenez used "other false 
names" in his past, that he had a history as a violent "perpetrator," and that he engaged in 
uncharged criminal conduct. Jimenez has established the first part of the Valdez test. 
B. AS THE STATE OBSERVED. THE TRIAL COURT RULED ON THE 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL DURING THE MIDDLE OF THE TRIAL; IN THAT 
REGARD. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF THE 
"TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL" BEFORE 
RULING ON THE MOTION. A REVIEW OF THE MATTER IN LIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED COMPELS REVERSAL. 
With respect to the second part of the Valdez test, the state recognizes that in 
considering prosecutorial misconduct, "the statements] must be viewed in light of the 
totality of the evidence presented at trial." (S.B. at 20 (citing State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 
1113,1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992))).) The trial court did not consider the improper statements in that context. 
Rather, the trial court ruled on each separate improper statement in isolation and in the 
middle of the defendant's case-in-chief. (R. 344:455-72.) Thus, the trial court failed to 
take into consideration the context of the improper statements and the total evidence 
8 
presented at trial before ruling on the mistrial motion. 
This Court should review the totality of the circumstances in assessing prejudice. 
Also, the state claims the misconduct was not prejudicial because the 
comments/questions were isolated (S.B. at 20), the evidence against Jimenez was 
substantial (S.B. at 22), and the jury understood that it should disregard the 
questions/comments (S.B. at 26), even though it was not instructed in that regard. 
Jimenez addresses each argument made by the state, as set forth below. 
1. The Four Statements Were Not Isolated; They Were Made During the 
Testimony of Defense Witnesses, Who Provided Evidence Relating to a Pivotal 
Issue of Fact: Jimenez' Mental State. 
With respect to the state's claim that the improper comments and questions were 
"isolated," the state asserts they were "asked on the second and third day of a four-day 
trial in which fourteen witnesses were called." (S.B. at 20.) While the state's assertions 
are in part correct (11 witnesses presented testimony at trial), it is necessary to view the 
matter "in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial." (S.B. at 20 (cites 
omitted).) That is, it is necessary to give context to the matter. 
In this case, no witness was called to testify on the first and fourth days of trial. 
The jury was selected on the first day of trial, and counsel provided opening statements. 
Thereafter, the jury was excused. (R. 342:142.) On the second day of trial, the state 
presented its case in chief. The state called 6 witnesses to testify (R. 343:183 (Amber 
Celeste Fabela), 200 (Ben Forbes), 215 (Chris Ownby), 225 (Manuel Angelo Rios), 289 
9 
(Todd C. Grey), 303 (Mark R. Chidester)), and presented a video-taped interview (R. 
343:197). At the end of the second day of trial, the defense called its first witness: 
Jimenez (R. 343:363.) The prosecutor improperly referred to the "other false names" 
during Jimenez' cross-examination (R. 343:369), just before jurors were excused for the 
evening. (R. 343:372-73.) It was one of the last things the jurors would hear and 
remember with respect to that day of trial. 
On the third day of trial the defense called four additional witnesses (R. 344:383 
(Dr. Rothfeder), 430 (Noemi "Monica" Jimenez), 481 (John Duane Moyes), 509 (Ron 
Thomas Edwards)) and the defense called Jimenez again at the close of the defendant's 
case. (R. 344:557.) The prosecutor engaged in further improper conduct during cross-
examination of Dr. Rothfeder and Monica. The prosecutor twice asked Dr. Rothfeder 
about Jimenez' "history of violence," and made reference to uncharged criminal conduct 
during Monica's cross-examination. 
Significantly, Dr. Rothfeder, Monica, and Jimenez presented evidence relating to 
Jimenez' mental state and refuting the state's claim that Jimenez shot the victim, Henry 
David Miera, with criminal intent, i.e. recklessly, intentionally, depraved, or knowingly, 
etc. (See R. 344:396-401,410-11,420-23; 344:438-39; 344:562-63, 573-74.) 
A review of the improper statements in light of the totality of the evidence 
presented at trial reveals a strategy. The prosecutor's strategy apparently was to cause the 
jury to distrust the witnesses presenting evidence refuting criminal intent. The prosecutor 
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led the jury to believe those witnesses were hiding information concerning Jimenez5 
"other false names", his past as a violent "perpetrator", and uncharged criminal conduct. 
The strategy was meant to expose Jimenez as a person with a violent, criminal past, 
through witnesses who were prepared to provide testimony refuting criminal intent with 
respect to the crime at issue. The potential for prejudice under those circumstances was 
not isolated but was great. The prosecutor's strategy was meant to distract the jury from 
the evidence refuting criminal intent, and cause the jury to view the defendant as a bad, 
violent person with a criminal past, thereby jeopardizing defendant's right to a fair trial. 
The prosecutor's improper conduct during the four instances identified herein was 
not isolated. Viewed in light of the evidence presented at trial, the improper comments 
and questions were prejudicial requiring reversal. See State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 534 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (prosecutor made improper reference twice, constituting reversible 
error). 
2. The Evidence Against Jimenez Was Not Substantial. Indeed, the Jury Was 
Required to Resolve Conflicts in Evidence Relating to the Pivotal Issue on Appeal: 
Jimenez' Mental State. 
With respect to the state's claim that the evidence against Jimenez was substantial, 
the state asserts the following: 
[The state's evidence] established that [1] Rios and his friends were unarmed when 
they stopped at the 7-Eleven on October 20 to let Rios use the restroom. [2] 
Defendant pulled in shortly thereafter, retrieved his gun from under his seat, and 
confronted Miera and Montoya, who were still in the car. Although much smaller 
than either Rios or Montoya, defendant did not retreat from them but, rather, 
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reached for his gun. [3] In response, Rios punched defendant in the face and 
immediately turned and ran. Montoya followed. [4] Defendant began shooting at 
them while he was still on the ground. Once back standing, he fired two shots into 
Miera's chest and then resumed shooting at Rios and Montoya. He fired seven 
shots in all before calling his wife and leaving the scene. [5] He then hid his car in 
a friend's garage, admitted to friends that he had killed someone, and [6] fled the 
State. 
(S.B. at 23 (bracketed numbers added).) 
Contrary to the state's assertions, the evidence was not substantial. Each point 
identified in brackets was in dispute in relevant part. The jury was required to resolve cre-
dibility issues and consider conflicts or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations. 
Specifically, with respect to [1], the evidence reflects that Jimenez reasonably 
believed Miera was armed. Jimenez testified that after he had been punched to the 
ground by Rios, he observed Miera open the car door and point an object at him that 
appeared to be a weapon. (See R. 344:562-65; see also R. 344:438.) Jimenez then drew 
his gun while Rios and Montoya ran for cover. Jimenez shot several times in response to 
the threat then left the 7-Eleven with his wife. (R. 344:563, 565, 573-75.) 
Thereafter, Rios and Montoya returned to the scene and removed an unknown item 
from the car. (R. 344:537-38.) Rios and Montoya also attended to Miera, who had been 
shot twice. (R. 343:241.) When officers arrived at the scene, the evidence supported that 
they did not conduct an investigation in the area for a possible weapon and/or the 
unknown item that was removed from the car. (See R. 344:522-25, 554.) Thus, the state 
was unable to specifically refute the possibility that Rios and Montoya removed a weapon 
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from the car and concealed it in the area after the shooting. (See R. 344:554 (officers 
investigating scene did not describe in reports that they searched for weapons).) The jury 
was required to resolve disputes in the evidence to determine whether Miera was armed 
and threatened Jimenez. 
As for [2] and [3], Jimenez testified that when he and Monica pulled in front of the 
7-Eleven, he was confronted by Rios and Montoya; they were looking for a fight. The 
men engaged in a verbal confrontation with Jimenez, then Rios punched Jimenez and 
knocked him to the ground. (R. 344:562-63, 573-74.) Rios testified that he and Montoya 
were much bigger than Jimenez, and they were boxers. (R. 343:245-46, 275.) According 
to Rios, he was not the kind of person who would "back down" during a verbal 
confrontation. (R. 343:246.) Rios believed the punch was enough to knock Jimenez out. 
(R. 343:276, 281.) 
Evidence presented by the state supported that Jimenez did not initiate the 
confrontation and he did not reach for his gun until after he was confronted by the men 
and knocked to the ground. (See R. 343:280 (Rios testified in earlier proceedings that the 
first time he observed the gun was after he hit Jimenez) 343:197, State's Exhibit 3 
(interview with television reporter where Montoya disclosed that he and Rios 
contemplated punching Jimenez before they learned he had a gun); Defendant's Exhibit 
3-A at 4-5 (transcript of interview between Montoya and television reporter).) In 
addition, Monica testified that Jimenez lifted his shirt and fired a gun only after he stood 
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up from being knocked to the ground. (R. 344:438-39.) The jury was required to resolve 
disputes in the evidence as to whether Jimenez revealed the weapon in response to or 
before the attack by Rios and Montoya. 
With respect to [4], Jimenez admitted to firing the weapon. That fact was not in 
dispute. Rather, a pivotal fact at trial was whether Jimenez acted in self defense or had 
criminal intent, i.e. whether his conduct was reckless, depraved, intentional, or knowing, 
including whether he suffered an emotional disturbance, or believed he was justified in 
his conduct. (See R. 251-52, 254-55, 260-261 (jury was given several instructions 
regarding criminal intent, requiring jury to resolve issue of Jimenez' mental state).) As 
set forth herein, Monica, Dr. Rothfeder and Jimenez provided evidence relating to lack of 
criminal intent. 
As for [5], a state witness (Amber Celeste Fabela) testified that she saw Jimenez 
and Monica shortly after the shooting. She testified that when Jimenez admitted to the 
shooting, he and Monica were in hysterics, they were a "mess", and Jimenez was angry, 
upset and scared. (R. 343:187, 189, 196.) The emotions Fabela described would be 
consistent with the emotions experienced after shooting a person in self defense or in 
defense of another. Fabela's testimony did not necessarily support the determination that 
Jimenez had criminal intent. (See also R. 344:589.) 
Finally, with respect to [6], while evidence of flight may be probative and may 
support that defendant had a guilty conscience, State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 39 (Utah 
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1987) ("We have previously ruled that evidence of flight is probative"), the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized its questionable value in a criminal trial: "[W]e have 
consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence that the accused 
fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
483 n.10 (1963). 
In this case, the jury was specifically advised that in considering evidence of flight, 
such evidence "is not sufficient in itself to establish the defendant's guilt." (R. 273.) 
Also, flight "does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged, and there may 
be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence." (R. 273.) Here, the evidence of 
flight simply meant the jury would be required to sift through dual interpretations and 
conflicts. It did not constitute overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
As this Court has recognized, appellate courts have generally refused, "to 
conclude that evidence was overwhelming in cases that ultimately rested on the jury's 
resolution of conflicting evidence, particularly where the defendant's credibility is 
involved." Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536; Trov. 688 P.2d at 486; State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 
400,403 (Utah 1986) ("When the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently 
conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced by an improper argument"). 
In this case, on each point identified by the state, the jury was required to sift 
through conflicting, disputed evidence. While Jimenez admitted to his involvement in the 
shooting, a pivotal issue before the jury concerned his mental state. With respect to each 
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witness who was prepared to provide evidence refuting the state's claim that Jimenez had 
criminal intent, the prosecutor made improper statements and asked improper questions to 
suggest Jimenez had a violent criminal past, thereby causing the jury to consider facts 
other than the crime at issue. Under the circumstances of this case and the totality of the 
evidence presented at trial, it is likely the jury convicted Jimenez based on the bad person 
the prosecutor portrayed him to be, rather than based on what he allegedly did. The 
prosecutor's improper comments/questions were prejudicial, requiring reversal. 
3. The Trial Judge Failed to Rule on Objections Relating to Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in Front of the Jury and Refused to Provide a Curative Instruction. 
Consequently, the Jury Was Not Properly Instructed with Respect to the 
Prosecutorial Misconduct. 
With respect to the curative instructions, as set forth in the opening Brief of 
Appellant, although the trial court sustained each objection to the prosecutor's improper 
comments/questions, the judge did not sustain objections in front of the jury. (Brief of 
Appellant at 27.) To be clear, the objections and the trial court rulings are set forth in the 
record. Any suggestion to the contrary disregards the undisputed transcripts.5 However, 
in some cases, objections were not sustained immediately and they were not sustained in 
front of the jury. 
s
 The state asserts that "Defendant concedes that he did not always ensure that the trial 
court's rulings on objections were on the record. See Aplt. Br. at 27." (S.B. at 26.) That is 
untrue. In fact, each objection and ruling is clearly set forth in the record. (See R. 
344:469-72.) The state's assertions are improper and should be disregarded. 
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Specifically, with respect to the prosecutor's questions regarding Jimenez' "other 
false names," the defense timely objected. (R. 343:369.) However, the trial court did not 
specify its ruling on the objection in front of the jury. (R. 343:369; see R. 344:469-70 
(judge sustained objection).) Rather, during a discussion outside the presence of the jury 
the next day, the judge ruled that he sustained the objections relating to the prosecutor's 
improper questions. (R. 344:469-70.) 
Also, when the prosecutor made reference to a "history of violence" (R. 344:403), 
the trial judge originally overruled the objection in front of the jury, prompting the 
prosecutor to repeat the question. (Id.) Sometime later and outside the presence of the 
jury, the judge reversed himself on the matter. (R. 344:472.) 
Because the trial judge did not rule in front of the jury in these two instances, there 
was no opportunity to cure the prosecutorial misconduct, and no opportunity for the jury 
to realize that the objections were sustained. 
With respect to the prosecutor's statement that Jimenez' possession of a gun was a 
crime "in and of itself," the judge sustained the objection in front of the jury but refused 
to provide a curative instruction. (R. 344:444-45.) 
Thereafter, once the evidence was presented, the trial court provided general 
instructions to the jury. Jurors were instructed that they should not consider evidence that 
was stricken or speculate as to matters where objections were sustained. (R. 238.) That 
instruction had no meaning to the jurors with respect to the objections sustained outside 
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their presence and relating to the prosecutorial misconduct. 
In addition, while jurors were generally instructed that they should "not consider as 
evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial," (R. 250), that instruction was 
not relevant here. The prosecutor here asked questions in such a way as to cause the jury 
to make an assumption or to draw an improper inference. See State v. Morrison, 937 
P.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (appellate court considers whether trial court 
instructed jury not to draw adverse presumption from prosecutorial misconduct to cure 
impact of such misconduct); Byrd, 937 P.2d at 535, 537 (same). 
A proper curative instruction to each act of misconduct would have been to advise 
the jury to disregard the statements in their entirety and to refrain from drawing any 
adverse presumptions from the statements. See Morrison. 937 P.2d at 1296-97; Byrd, 
937 P.2d at 535. Such an instruction was not provided. 
The state has taken the position that even though the trial court did not rule in a 
fashion that would give meaning to the general instructions provided to the jury, this 
Court may assume that the jury nevertheless was well-versed in the rules of criminal law 
and procedure. Specifically, according to the state, "the jury heard defendant object, 
observed counsel and the court in an off-the-record side-bar, and then saw the State drop 
its prior question and move on to a new subject... It is reasonable to assume that the jury 
understood, based on how defendant's objections were handled, that the court had in fact 
sustained them." (S.B. at 26.) The state's assertions are unreasonable, particularly since 
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seven of the eight jurors had no prior experience as jurors in a criminal trial. (See R. 
342:115-16 and 345:699-700 (jury selection); and envelope containing juror 
questionnaires for selected jurors, question no. 16.) 
Furthermore, Utah appellate courts have repeatedly ruled that when errors occur at 
trial, it is a simple and well-established practice to cure them. 
[Curative] instructions are a settled and necessary feature of our judicial process 
and one of the most important tools by which a court may remedy errors at trial. 
See Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292 ("A curative instruction is often mentioned by courts 
as an important consideration in reviewing the constitutionality of prosecutorial 
comments."). There is rarely a case in which a trial judge is not called upon to 
affirm an attorney's objection and instruct the jury to disregard an improper 
question or an improper answer a witness has given. Such instructions are 
curative instructions that trial judges routinely give during the presentation of 
evidence as well as at the end of trial, before the jury deliberates. If a trial judge 
could not correct errors as they occur, few trials would be successfully concluded. 
Moreover, our judicial system greatly relies upon the jury's integrity to uphold the 
jury oath, including its promise to follow all of the judge's instructions. Utah is 
not alone in utilizing curative instructions; our research indicates that virtually 
every jurisdiction, both state and federal, relies upon such instructions in curing 
errors during trial and in reviewing errors on appeal. 
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271-72 (Utah 1998) (cites omitted) (emphasis added); 
Byrd, 937 P.2d at 535 (in considering prosecutorial misconduct at trial, appellate court 
will look to whether curative instruction was provided to minimize harm); Morrison, 937 
P.2d at 1296-97 (court considers whether trial court instructed jury not to draw adverse 
presumption from prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352-53 
(Utah 1997) (prosecutorial misconduct did not warrant reversal where jury was properly 
instructed on the matter). 
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Curative instructions minimize prejudice. Since the trial court failed to provide 
curative instructions and failed to rule in a manner that would make the general 
instructions relevant to the jury, the prosecutor's misconduct was not cured. In that 
regard, the prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced Jimenez, requiring reversal. 
POINT II. THE STATE TAKES THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER 
REMARKS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT OUT OF CONTEXT. 
ALSO. THE REMARKS WERE PREJUDICIAL. 
With respect to the second issue on appeal, Jimenez maintains that the prosecutor 
also engaged in misconduct during closing argument when he compared Jimenez - who 
appeared at trial in the "garb of innocence," State v. Mitchell 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) — to Rios who appeared at trial in prison clothes and shackles. Specifically, 
the prosecutor stated the following: 
Also I ask you this, in terms of the defendant and his credibility as to the 
events, you have had a chance to see not only the defendant in this courtroom 
today and this week with how he presents himself, with how he packages himself 
in appearance and dress and haircut and glasses and demeanor, in temper or lack 
thereof, you have seen him in every one of those aspects on October 20th, 1996. Is 
this an honest packaging? 
Manny Rios was here in chains. Manny Rios should be in chains. But 
Manny Rios isn't anything except what Manny Rios is. But you have - and I 
recall - I want you to recall Mr. Shapiro's opening statement, and he was talking 
about the newly - the couple, not newly married couple, but the couple, they had 
gotten their child a baby-sitter and they were able to go out for this date. Just your 
average couple. And on the other hand we had the drunken rowdy trouble making 
boxers cruising for trouble. Is either one of those portrayals honest now that you 
know the situation? Or is it part of the packaging? 
(R. 345:659-60.) The prosecutor's remarks necessarily commented unfairly on Jimenez' 
20 
character and they interfered with his right to the presumption of innocence. (Brief of 
Appellant at 28-33.) The remarks called attention to matters that should not have been 
considered by jurors in reaching their verdict; specifically, Jimenez' fundamental right to 
appear at trial in civilian clothes. See Mitchell 824 P.2d at 473 ("Numerous cases 
support the view that [the right to appear in the 'garb of innocence'] is an essential 
component of a fair and impartial trial"); see also State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, fflj3-4, 
999 P.2d 1; Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980). 
The state disagrees and argues on appeal that because Jimenez testified at trial, the 
prosecutor was at liberty to point out the differences in "defendant's appearance at the 
time of the incident and at the time of trial" (S.B at 31 (citing People v. Porrata. 613 
N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (III App. 1993); see also Robertson v. State, 319N.E.2d 833, 836 
(Ind. 1974); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 480 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. Super. 1984)).) 
The state's argument is misplaced. In this case, the prosecutor's comments were not 
limited to pointing out the differences between defendant's appearance at the time of the 
incident and his appearance at trial Rather, the prosecutor compared Jimenez' packaging 
in "dress and haircut and glasses and demeanor" to Rios' appearance as an inmate "in 
chains."6 The prosecutor asked the jury to consider the honesty of Rios' packaging and then 
6
 The state isolates and parses the prosecutor's statements in such a way so as to suggest 
that the prosecutor's statements regarding Jimenez and Rios were unrelated. According to 
the state, the prosecutor's comment on Jimenez' packaging in "dress and haircut and 
glasses and demeanor" related to the fact that Jimenez chose not to appear for trial in the 
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to consider Jimenez5 packaging. Jimenez5 complaint on appeal is that he had a fundamental 
right to appear at trial in the "garb of innocence," and the prosecutor was not at liberty to call 
attention to the exercise of such a right in an effort to discredit Jimenez5 testimony and/or to 
bolster Rios5 credibility to the jury. 
The state also asserts that because Jimenez testified, "his credibility may be 
impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness." (S.B. at 32 (citing State 
v. Winward. 941 P.2d 627,634 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (other cites omitted)).) Contrary to the 
state's assertions, there are limits to impeaching a criminal defendant's testimony. The limits 
relate to fundamental rights. A prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's right to remain 
silent while in police custody, see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976) (a prosecutor 
may not refer to defendant's post-Miranda silence to suggest guilt), or comment that 
defendant hired a lawyer and thereafter remained silent, Craig v. State, 375 So.2d 1252, 
clothes he wore on the day of the incident. (S.B. at 34.) Yet, Jimenez wore civilian 
clothes both at the time of the incident and at trial. 
Thereafter, according to the state, the prosecutor apparently changed the subject to 
assert simply that Rios' appearance in chains was consistent with his violent criminal 
history. (S.B. at 35-36.) That assertion has taken the prosecutor's comments out of 
context. The reference to Rios' prison clothes was meant to bolster his credibility: 
according to the prosecutor, his honest appearance supported his honesty at trial. The 
prosecutor specifically compared Rios to Jimenez in that regard and emphasized that 
Jimenez' packaging could not be trusted. The prosecutor's comments, comparing 
Jimenez' "packaging" in civilian clothes to Rios' "honesty" in chains, cannot be avoided. 
The state's strained analysis isolating the statements defies common sense and 
understanding, and is improper under the law, where the challenged statements must be 
viewed "in context." See State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 804 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 
982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998). 
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1254-55 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979). A prosecutor may not comment that a defendant failed to 
take the witness stand to assert his innocence. 
Since a defendant has certain fundamental rights at trial, a prosecutor cannot use the 
exercise of those rights as a basis for impeaching the defendant's credibility. See Doyle, 426 
U.S. at 611; Craig, 375 So.2d at 1254-55; Byrd, 937 P.2d at 537. The same principle should 
apply when a defendant appears at trial in civilian clothes. A prosecutor should not be 
allowed to discredit him by comparing his "packaging" to a witness in a prison jumpsuit and 
chains. The comparison is improper and draws the attention of jurors to matters they are not 
allowed to consider. 
With respect to the prejudice analysis, as set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, 
the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument harmed Jimenez. (Brief of 
Appellant, Point II.B.) 
In addition, as set forth above, see supra Point I.B., the improper comments related 
to the prosecutor's strategy. That is, the prosecutor used improper innuendo to cause the jury 
to believe Jimenez was hiding his real image. The prosecutor suggested Jimenez was hiding 
his use of "other false names," his undisclosed violent history, his uncharged criminal 
conduct, and his true "packaging." The potential for prejudice under the circumstances was 
not isolated but was great requiring reversal of the matter. 
In the event the individual errors in this case are deemed to be harmless, Jimenez 
urges this Court to find that the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal, as set forth 
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in Point III of the opening Brief of Appellant. (See Brief of Appellant Point III (citing 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920,928 (Utah 1990); see also State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)).) 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and as set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, 
Jimenez respectfully requests that this Court reverse the convictions in this case, and remand 
the matter for further proceedings as this Court may deem appropriate. 
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